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Abstract: According to Schopenhauer, Kant’s arguments about the transcendental 
ideality of space and time have implications for matter through the concept of causality 
and the principle of sufficient reason. In this article, I examine to what extent this 
principle, together with space, time and causality can be considered a priori concepts 
in the light of classical and modern physics. The concepts of matter and field in present 
day physics, and their possible a priori fundaments, are revisited in a modern context.
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Resumo: Segundo Schopenhauer, os argumentos de Kant sobre a idealidade transcendental 
do espaço e do tempo têm implicações para a matéria por meio do conceito de causalidade 
e do princípio de razão suficiente. Neste artigo, examino até que ponto este pressuposto, 
juntamente com as noções de espaço, de tempo e de causalidade, podem ser considerados 
conceitos a priori à luz da física clássica e moderna. Os conceitos de matéria e de campo na 
física atual e seus possíveis fundamentos a priori são revisitados sob um contexto moderno.
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Kant argued that space and time are a priori forms of intuition (Anschauungsformen), 
and “transcendental aesthetics cannot contain more than these two elements” (B58)1. 
Objects affect our senses as phenomena in space and time, and the phenomena are 
produced by a thing-in-itself which is not directly accessible to the senses.  
In The World as Will and Representation (W I), Schopenhauer accepted Kant’s 
transcendental aesthetics, but reduced the categories of his transcendental logics to only 
one: causality. He argued that causality is another form of the perception of phenomena, 
though distinct from space and time, and that it is also given a priori, i.e., prior to all 
experience. He thus stood in opposition to empiricists such as Locke and Hume, who 
supposed that our concept of causality follows a posteriori from empirical experience.
In his famous doctoral thesis, The Fourfold Root of The Principle of Sufficient Reason 
(G), Schopenhauer argued that causality is indissolubly associated to the principle of 
sufficient reason. He identified four roots of this principle, two of them being related to 
the perception of matter which he stated to be “through and through causality”.
Can the above principles be sustained in the light of modern science, particularly 
modern physics? Regarding these problems, I pointed out in previous works (Hacyan2) 
that the concepts of space and time, as known in the macroscopic world, do not apply to 
I  Profesor del Instituto de Física de la Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. hacyan@fisica.unam.mx
1 All references to KANT are to the Critique of Pure Reason.
2 HACYAN, S. Física y metafísica del espacio y del tiempo (2004). On the trascendental ideality of space and time in modern physics 
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the atomic world due the existence of non-local effects, and that this well-established fact 
is perfectly compatible with Kant´s thesis that space and time are forms of intuition, not 
to be found in the thing-in-itself producing a phenomenon, but in its perception. 
The aim of the present article is to examine whether causality could be a concept 
a priori, as stated by Schopenhauer, and to analyze its relationship with the concepts of 
matter and mass in the light of classical and modern physics. In particular, I will consider 
the well-established notion of field in modern physics, since it has replaced the vague 
idea of substance as the substratum of matter in classical philosophy.
 Sufficient reason and causality
According to Empiricism, we learn that a certain effect is due to a certain cause 
only by experience. Accordingly, causality should be a probabilistic concept, since 
we cannot know by experience that a certain phenomenon which has never occurred 
could occur someday. Schopenhauer, on the contrary, argued that causality is a form of 
understanding given a priori: the fact that we always associate a cause to an effect is an 
innate process and could not be otherwise, since it is the only way to give a meaning to all 
empirical experiences. By experience alone, we would perceive only a temporal succession 
of unconnected states.
Causality is closely related to the principle of sufficient reason, since any effect 
must have a cause, but this relation, according to Schopenhauer, is also given a priori. In 
his doctoral thesis (G), he identified the first root of the principle of sufficient reason as 
the causal association of sense stimuli to the phenomenon producing it. He gave as an 
example the physico-chemical stimuli produced by light on the retina and the transmission 
of this information to the brain through the optical nerve; this crude information must, 
however, be processed by a certain form of understanding in order to yield an image of 
reality. In the modern language of computers, we could say that the brain has a software 
that processes the received information and produces the images of the world, just as 
an actual computer transforms electrical currents in its circuits into images on a screen: 
in this case the stimuli are a myriad of tiny electronic currents. Anachronisms apart, 
Schopenhauer’s point is that our mind is equipped with such an innate software: our 
brain is born with it and we learn to use it through experience.
Let us illustrate the a priori search of sufficient reason with some examples taken 
from our perception of physical phenomena. Consider the obvious (and rather naïve) 
example of the fall of heavy bodies due to the action of gravity. If it were a purely empirical 
fact, it could occasionally happen that a body remained in levitation. Based on previous 
experiences, it would be extremely improbable but not fully impossible; after all, it is 
only a matter of probability. In an analogous example, it may be an empirical fact that 
I have never won at a lottery, but if I win someday, no law of nature would be violated. 
Of course, we accept that bodies fall by the action of gravity due to a universal law of 
nature. If, by any chance, it happened that a body did not fall, we would not be satisfied 
with the explanation that it is very improbable but not utterly impossible. Quite on the 
contrary, we would look for a reason for such a phenomenon; for instance, that the said 
body is lighter than air, that it is held by invisible strings, or levitated by magnetic fields, 
etc. Actually, that is the purpose of science: given a new and unexpected phenomenon, to 
look always for its cause. (Incidentally, Schopenhauer was aware that weight is knowable 
a posteriori, not a priori as Kant believed: see Ch. 4 of (W I).
A more general example of the principle of sufficient reason is given by Newton´s 
laws of dynamics. In the first law, Newton stated that a body remains in its state of rest 
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or uniform motion if no forces act on it. However, the concept of force is specified only 
by the second law: a body changes its state of rest or motion (more precisely, its quantity 
of motion) if a force acts on it. But this is just an acknowledgment that the only way to 
define force is as the sufficient reason for the change of a state. Euler himself clearly made 
the point, in his treatise of mechanics, that the motion of a body is necessarily due to 
some reason, and that this reason is nothing else than what we call force: see particularly 
Proposition 7 in his Mechanica3.
Another, more actual example is the phenomenon of superconductivity. In 1911, 
Kamerlingh Onnes made the surprising discovery that the electrical resistivity of mercury 
drops exactly to zero below a certain temperature. Afterwards, physicists spent several 
decades looking for an explanation of this unexpected phenomenon; they finally found its 
(sufficient) reason in the realm of quantum mechanics.
Yet another example is the actual situation in cosmology: the observational 
data fit quite well with the model of the Universe predicted by the theory of General 
Relativity, but only if an invisible “dark matter” is assumed to exist, together with an 
even more mysterious cosmic acceleration: the so-called “dark energy”. At present, most 
cosmologists believe that the model is correct and look for direct evidence of dark matter 
(as a sufficient cause). Other researchers have pointed out that gravitation may not behave 
as believed at very large scales. In either case, a sufficient reason is sought, whether in 
the form of a new kind of matter or a departure from General Relativity, the currently 
accepted theory of gravity. In all the given examples, causality is closely related to the 
principle of sufficient reason: there is a reason for every phenomenon. 
The perception and study of nature was mainly done through direct senses in 
Schopenhauer’s times, as he discussed at length in 4R. It is mainly in the nineteenth 
century that scientists started to study the world with the massive support of sophisticated 
apparatuses intended to extricate its secrets from nature. Thus, for instance, Faraday 
performed all his crucial experiments with schemes and apparatuses designed to make 
visible the effects of the invisible mechanisms producing electric and magnetic forces. 
Gone was the direct perception of nature so celebrated by the poets (see Sect. 6 below)! 
A century ago, Duhem4 discussed this important point in detail: “An experiment in 
Physics is not simply the observation of a phenomenon; it is, in addition, the theoretical 
interpretation of this phenomenon”. Indeed, a layperson visiting a physicist’s laboratory 
would not deduce what it is all about but would only see a set of apparatuses and monitors 
displaying graphs and numbers. Physicists who study, say, subatomic particles do not 
see electrons, protons, quarks, Higgs bosons, etc. in a direct way: they can only analyze 
a huge quantity of data collected by appropriately designed detectors and investigate 
the processes that take place using a theoretical model. The data produced in modern 
experiments must be processed according to very complicated (real) software, something 
similar, in a sense, to what the brain does with the primary stimuli received from our 
sense organs; in other words, the brain uses a huge extension of its innate “software”.
In summary, there are various steps in the process of understanding physical 
processes. In Kantian terms, there is a thing-in-itself that produces a phenomenon. This 
phenomenon is perceived as a direct stimulus in our sense organs and is further processed 
by the brain. Alternatively, a complex phenomenon can produce a set of data in an apparatus 
in the form of numbers or images, and these data in turn are processed according to a pre-
established theoretical model. In the former case, the relation between cause and effect 
is provided by an internal innate “software” (a priori) in the brain; in the latter case, by an 
external real software in an artificial brain. In modern science, experimental results and 
3  EULER, L. Mechanica.
4  DUHEM, P. La théorie physique (1914)
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their interpretations are necessarily mediated by a theory providing the causal relations 
between crude data and the theoretical description of a physical phenomenon. If some 
unexpected result or inconsistency appears, it must have a sufficient reason: it may be 
something yet unknown within a known theory (such as dark matter) or an inadequacy of 
this theory (such as a possible modification of General Relativity).
Matter and causality
Matter is quantified as mass, and mass can be determined empirically, either directly 
as weight or indirectly by the motion of a body. Accordingly, Kant did not consider mass 
as a pure form of intuition a priori. On this point, he is quite explicit in stating that “the 
possibility of the synthesis of the predicate ‘weight’ with the concept of ‘body’… rests upon 
experience” (B12). 
Schopenhauer, however, dealing with the third root of the principle of sufficient reason, 
stated that matter is the “perceptibility of time and space, on the one hand, and causality that 
has become objective, on the other” (G §35). He further elaborated on this point in (W I); for 
instance, in Chap. 4: “Time and space, each for itself, can be mentally presented apart from 
matter, whereas matter cannot be so presented apart from time and space”.
In Chap. 24, he stated, in more detail, that “the whole being of matter consists in acting. 
Only thus does it occupy space and last in time. It is through and through pure causality”.
In short, Schopenhauer’s conclusion was that causality manifests itself through 
matter as we perceive it. Accordingly, he included matter in parallel with space and time in 
his table of prædicabilia a priori, which he presented as “all the fundamental truths rooted in 
our a priori knowledge of perception” (W II Chap. IV of the Supp.). In his own words:
Matter… is not object but condition of experience, just as are space and 
time. This is why, in the accompanying table of our pure fundamental 
knowledge a priori, matter has been able to take the place of causality, and, 
together with space and time, figures as the third thing which is purely 
formal, and therefore is inherent in our intellect.
Of course, some of the a priori truths in his table can be questioned by modern 
science, but in most cases their a priori nature is worth examining… even at the risk of 
falling into anachronisms! 
Thus, for instance, the first a priori truth states: “there is only one time… -- only one 
space… -- only one Matter, and all different materials are different states of matter; as such 
it is called Substance”. Of course, the concept of substance used by ancient philosophers 
may be nowadays completely outdated, but what Schopenhauer apparently had in mind is 
a substratum of all matter; see Section 4 below for a more detailed discussion. 
The third a priori truth states; “time cannot be thought away… —space cannot be 
thought away… -- The annihilation of matter cannot be conceived, yet the annihilation 
of all its forms and qualities can”. In a modern interpretation, we may say that matter 
and energy can be transformed into each other, but the total matter-energy cannot be 
annihilated (for instance, an electron and a positron produce two gamma rays, particles 
of pure energy). I will return to this point in section 4 below.
The fourth a priori truth is: “Matter exists, i.e., acts in all the dimensions of space 
and throughout the whole length of time, and thus unites and thereby fills these two. In 
this consists the true nature of matter. It is therefore through and through causality.” This 
seems to be obvious, but Schopenhauer’s point is that it cannot be otherwise since the 
existence of what we perceive as matter is prior to experience.
The fifth a priori truth is that time, space and matter are infinitely divisible. Of 
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course, we now know about the existence of quarks, electrons and other elementary 
particles, but in physical theories these are described as point particles having no structure 
and therefore admitting no further division5; if some structure were discovered in the 
future, more elementary constituents would be looked for.
The sixth a priori truth is that time, space and matter are homogeneous and form 
a continuum. This seems to contradict what we know about elementary particles, but the 
field of modern physics does form a continuum (see Section 4 below). 
Finally, let us discuss at some length the eighteenth a priori truth:
Time is not measurable directly through itself, but only indirectly through 
motion, which is in space and time simultaneously; thus, time is measured 
by the motion of the sun and of the clock.
Space is measurable directly through itself, and indirectly through motion, 
which is in time and space simultaneously; thus, for example, an hour’s 
walk, and the distance of the fixed stars expressed as so many light years.
Matter as such (mass) is measurable, i.e., determinable according to its 
quantity, only indirectly, thus only through the magnitude of the motion, 
which it receives and imparts by being repelled or attracted.
The point is that space, time and mass must be measured with respect to some 
preassigned standards. Time was measured in the past with the periodic motion of celestial 
bodies, and nowadays it is measured with the periodic vibrations of a cesium atom. Space 
is presently measured in terms of the distance covered by light in a (well defined) unit of 
time. As for mass, its quantification has been more problematic; in the eighth a priori truth 
Schopenhauer stated that “by reason of matter we weigh”, but it has been considerably 
more difficult to find a standard of mass in terms of purely natural constants. It is only 
recently that this aim was achieved: the Sèvres standard is now replaced by an atomic 
standard fixing the value of the Planck constant.
3. Mass and motion
At this point, it is worth noticing that there are several definitions of mass in physics 
textbooks. It is usually defined as the “quantity of matter”, although it is never specified 
how such a quantity can be measured. Moreover, there is a general confusion between 
mass and weight. We know that weight, though related to mass, is a manifestation of the 
gravitational force and vanishes in outer space. Obviously, this was unknown in antiquity, 
and there was even a confusion between size and weight since bigger bodies are usually 
heavier than smaller ones6.
In the Principia, Newton defined mass as the “quantity of matter”, which is “the 
measure of the same [matter], arising from its density and bulk conjointly”. It appears, 
therefore, that density was for Newton a more primary concept than mass. As for Newton’s 
second law, Euler argued that the primary concept should be force and not mass, since the 
mass of a body is measured from its motion produced by a force of prescribed magnitude. 
Accordingly, Euler postulated mass as the ratio of force to the acceleration it produces.
However, it is not obvious that force should be a primary concept. Jammer (1961) 
remarks that, due to the new positivistic attitude: “What once, in Newtonian physics, 
played a central role was now regarded as an obscure metaphysical notion that has to be 
banished from science”. Is it then possible to measure mass without referring to force (or 
gravity)? Ernst Mach7 conceived a scheme to deduce the relative masses of two bodies in 
5  “Superstrings” have some structure, but in an abstract mathematical space.
6  JAMMER, M. Concepts of mass.
7  MACH, E. The science of mechanics.
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mutual interaction from their accelerations, but the method is far from being practical.
Summing up, while the concept of acceleration is given in terms of space and 
time, it is not clear that force or mass should be primary concepts. In any case, mass 
can be measured only through motion (or equilibrium) in space and time, as stated by 
Schopenhauer in his table of prædicabilia.
Substance, matter and field
Classical philosophers call “substance” the underlying and permanent element of 
the world. Kant thought that it is necessary to “presuppose its existence throughout all 
time” (B 228), since “the unity of experience would never be possible if we were willing 
to allow that new things, that is, new substances, could come into existence” (B 229).
Regarding mass, Kant gave the example of how a philosopher would determine 
the weight of smoke: “Subtract from the weight of the wood burnt the weight of the 
ashes which are left over, and you have the weight of the smoke”. This, however, as Kant 
pointed out, is based on the presupposition that “matter (substance) does not vanish, 
but only suffers an alteration of form” (B 228). This should be known a priori, following 
from a principle of permanence, even though it can be experimentally confirmed or 
disconfirmed a posteriori. If disconfirmed, some sufficient reason for the discrepancy 
should be looked for without abandoning the general principle; otherwise, physics 
could not be an exact science! 
As for Schopenhauer, he assumed that matter is “the true and admissible content 
of the conception of substance”. Thus
The eternity of matter follows from the fact that the law of causality refers 
only to the states of bodies… it is by no means related to the existence of 
that which bears these states and has been given the name of substance… 
Substance is permanent… (G § 20).
Hence the different manifestations of matter are accidents of the substance, or 
more precisely “a particular mode of action… in concreto” (G § 21). On this point, at least, 
Schopenhauer follows Locke, who divided qualities into primary and secondary, the latter 
being mutable.
Furthermore, Schopenhauer argued in his criticism of Kantian philosophy 
(appendix of W I) that “… the concept of substance was formed merely in order to be the 
vehicle for surreptitiously introducing the concept of the immaterial substance”, namely 
soul. Substance is left only with matter if the concept of soul is eliminated. 
Of course, physics is not concerned with the soul, and it is therefore irrelevant, 
from our present point of view, whether substance is identified with matter or vice versa. 
In any case, the conservation of mass-energy and the field are the fundamental concepts 
in modern physics, since they encompass both matter and its (immaterial!) interactions.
The fundamental concept of energy, together with its conservation law, appeared 
in physical theories in the middle of the nineteenth century. It is only then that physicists 
realized that there must be some conserved quantities besides matter in the physical 
world (in other words, satisfying Kant’s principle of permanence). Since then, the concept 
of force was gradually substituted by the more abstract but mathematically well-defined 
concept of energy. Finally, when Einstein proved the equivalence between mass and 
energy, it became clear that what was conserved is mass and energy. 
Though the conservation of mass and energy is at present perfectly well 
accepted, it is nevertheless an empirical principle of physics. As such, Kant would 
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say that it lacks “strict universality and apodictic certainty”. An historical curiosity 
may illustrate this point: When physicists discovered that energy was apparently not 
conserved in nuclear beta decays, no less an authority than Niels Bohr proposed the 
daring hypothesis that the conservation of energy could be a statistical principle 
that does not apply at the atomic level. The alternative proposed by Wolfgang Pauli 
was to keep this principle at the expense of postulating the existence of an unknown 
invisible particle that would carry the missing energy away. Thus, in a sense, Pauli 
was following the method of Kant’s hypothetical philosopher: instead of smoke, he 
weighted an even more elusive object, which turned out to be the neutrino. At the 
time of this discussion, both alternatives seemed equally convincing as sufficient 
reasons, but experiments finally confirmed Pauli’s hypothesis. 
The concept of field, as the substratum of all particles and their interactions, 
was forged by physicists in the nineteenth century and is widely used nowadays. 
Obviously, it would be an anachronism to interpret it as the substance of classical 
philosophy, but the important point to be stressed is that the existence of something 
acting as the universal substratum of all material (or immaterial) phenomena must be 
a knowledge a priori, since it cannot be proved empirically. 
The notion of field was introduced by Michael Faraday when he noticed 
that electrically or magnetically charged bodies interact through some invisible 
and immaterial “lines of force”. Based on Faraday’s empirical laws, James Clerk 
Maxwell elaborated a mathematical theory of the electromagnetic field that proved 
to be enormously successful. Quite generally, physicists nowadays define a field as 
a mathematical function of space and time, that is, a function that assigns a certain 
quantity or set of quantities to every point of space-time. The field, as something 
invisible but perfectly real, was fully accepted by physicists of the twentieth century. 
In this respect, Einstein noted that8: 
The concept of the material objects was gradually replaced as the 
fundamental concept of physics by that of the field. Under the influence of 
the ideas of Faraday and Maxwell the notion developed that the whole of 
physical reality could perhaps be represented as a field whose components 
depend on four space-time parameters.
Material objects interact between themselves in different ways and it is one of 
the most important purpose of physics to explain their interactions. As mentioned by 
Einstein, this was achieved in the nineteenth century for electromagnetism with the 
concept of field. Another force of nature, gravity, can also be described in terms of a field, 
as in general relativity (the gravitational field can be interpreted as a Riemannian space, 
but that is another matter). 
With the advent of quantum mechanics, it was possible to describe atomic and 
nuclear processes with a mathematical theory of quantized fields. Quantum Field Theory 
(QFT) proved to be a most successful theory encompassing all electromagnetic and nuclear 
processes. The so-called Standard Model of elementary particles, which is based on QFT, 
has been confirmed in all possible ways and provides an accurate description of nature at 
the atomic and subatomic level… even though its success is rather surprising, and many 
physicists still look for a more profound theory that may sustain it.
QFT is a mathematical theory that describes various kinds of fields as functions of 
space and time, which are supposed to form a continuum9. Space and time, the two forms 
of intuition according to Kant, are therefore the primary and fundamental concepts of 
8  Preface to JAMMER, M. Concepts of mass.
9  There have been some theoretical intents to quantize space and time, but without clear results.
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QFT, and the field itself depend on certain physical parameters with units of length, time 
and mass-energy. In modern physics, it is the sufficient reason for the entire existence of 
matter and its interactions.
Moreover, according to the second a priori truth in the table of prædicabilia: 
“different matters are not so through substance but through accidents”, and we can 
interpret “accidents” as particular manifestations of physical fields. 
 Determinism and uncertainty
The concept of determinism is closely related to the principle of sufficient reason 
and causality. Let us consider it from the point of view of modern physics. To begin with, 
it must be pointed out that determinism and uncertainty are sometimes confused. By 
determinism it is understood that a given cause has always a unique effect… that could 
or could not be calculated in practice. Uncertainty is about the fact that the cause (or 
effect) cannot be known with absolute precision. Even though the laws of physics may 
be perfectly deterministic, the knowledge of the initial conditions may not be precise 
enough to calculate the future evolution of a physical system with absolute precision. 
As is well known in physics, to calculate the evolution of a mechanical system one 
must know both the dynamical equations that govern it and its initial condition. The 
uncertainty refers to the latter only. 
In quantum mechanics, the evolution of an atomic system (in the non-relativistic 
limit) can be determined by the Schrödinger equation, which is fully deterministic. This 
equation enables the calculation of the so-called “wave function” describing all possible 
states of the system. According to the standard interpretation of quantum mechanics, 
it is the observation that forces the quantum system to manifest itself, with certain 
probability, in one of the possible states: this is known as the “collapse of the wave-
function”. 
As for uncertainty, it is described in quantum mechanics by Heisenberg’s famous 
principle that refers to the impossibility of measuring with absolute precision both 
the position and the momentum of a particle. This principle applies to the distance 
along a certain direction (say, the x axis) and the component of the momentum in that 
same direction. However, it does not apply to the component of the momentum in a 
perpendicular direction (say, along the y axis). In the language of quantum mechanics, 
a pair of two observables (such as position, velocity, energy, etc.) can be measured, in 
principle, with unlimited precision if the operators that represent them commute. In 
other words, one may not affect the outcome of the other observation when performing 
joint measurements. Despite the principle of uncertainty, quantum mechanics is the 
most precise theory ever elaborated, since it permits to calculate with amazing precision 
most processes in the atomic world. It all depends on what kind of observations are 
realized.
The real implication of the uncertainty principle in quantum mechanics is that 
not all measurements can be performed with absolute precision. In other words, not all 
measurements may be meaningful and not all the questions to nature can be answered 
without contradiction. However, this does not contradict the principle of sufficient 
reason, since this principle does not imply that a cause or an effect should be determined 
with absolute certainty. 
In an essay on philosophical matters, Heisenberg10 intended to refute Kant 
arguing that the principle of sufficient reason did not apply in quantum mechanics. 
10 HEISENBERG, W. Physics and beyond.
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He gave as an example the decay of a radioactive nucleus: the exact time at which the 
nucleus decays emitting an electron cannot be calculated; so it is strictly probabilistic. 
However, Heisenberg was confusing determinism with sufficient reason. Moreover, 
he was considering the description of a physical phenomenon, but as Schopenhauer 
clearly stated (WWR, chap 53): “It is just the knowledge belonging to the principle of 
sufficient reason, with which we never reach the inner nature of things, but endlessly 
pursue phenomena only…”.
It is true that it is not possible to predict the exact moment when the decay 
occurs, but that is not the point. The point is that physicists can look for the reason 
of such a process… and they have actually found one! It was discovered that the reason 
why a nucleus emits an electron is the process known as beta decay (the spontaneous 
transmutation of a neutron into a proton, an electron and an antineutrino), and, in 
turn, that the reason for this process is the existence of the weak interactions that occur 
in nuclear physics. And, again, the reason for the existence of such an interaction is 
the now well-established theory of electro-weak interactions. And the reason for the 
existence of such interactions may, perhaps, be found in the future in the context of 
a theory more fundamental than the presently known Standard Model of elementary 
particles. And so on.
On mathematics
Schopenhauer was not fond of mathematics. Without denying its practical 
use, he was convinced that mathematics could yield a quantitative description of the 
material world, but that it could never provide an understanding of its causal relations. 
“Where calculating begins, understanding ends” was his statement on this matter (G, 
§21; see also Chap. XIII of W I). His view may seem to be anachronic nowadays, but it 
must be realized that his dislike of mathematics was shared by many other intellectuals 
of his time who longed for a direct perception of nature, without the intermediacy of 
abstract concepts. Even Isaac Newton was criticized by his contemporary colleagues 
for having “only” described the motion of planets, without explaining the real cause of 
gravity. Goethe, a contemporary much-admired by Schopenhauer, was a strong critic of 
abstractions in the description of nature; they might be quite useful, he said, but “it does 
not occur to the architect to pass off his palaces as mountain sides and forests” (cited 
by Heisenberg11). Even among physicists, the case of Michael Faraday is noteworthy: his 
knowledge of mathematics was quite limited, and he deliberately avoided mathematical 
descriptions in the treatises he authored. 
Nowadays, we are used to the enormous success of mathematics in describing 
physical phenomena. Nevertheless, Schopenhauer was right in a certain sense; a 
mathematical description yields only numbers, but not a real understanding. Quantum 
mechanics is an excellent example of it: it is based entirely on abstract concepts, such 
as wave functions, operators, probability amplitudes, spin, etc., together with rigorous 
mathematical formulas that describe their evolution. But though it has proved to be 
the most precise description of physical phenomena, a description in terms of known 
concepts, such as particles and mechanical actions, has proved to be impossible. Any 
attempt to “explain” quantum mechanics in terms of familiar concepts leads inevitably 
to paradoxical conclusions.
The fact that mathematics is so effective may well be one of the greatest mysteries 
of modern physics. It has not been explained and such an effectiveness is, indeed, quite 
11  HEISENBERG, W. Across the frontiers.
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unreasonable, as Eugene Wigner12 has well pointed out. In any case, we can agree with 
Schopenhauer that where understanding ends, calculating begins… provided that we 
are aware that calculating may go unexpectedly far!
Conclusions
All physical theories and all measurements, in any system of units, involve 
space, time, and mass-energy. Accordingly, the irreducible elements of any system of 
units in physics are the standards of length, time and mass, the three a priori forms of 
understanding according to Schopenhauer, as he argued at length in his writings. It was 
in the twentieth century that a closer relation between space and time became manifest 
with Einstein’s theory of relativity, and a further connection with mass was revealed 
when Planck discovered the quantization of energy. 
As argued above, causality is a fundamental concept of physics that must not be 
confused with determinism. In quantum mechanics, the intervention of an observer 
causes the reduction of the wave-function to a particular state, which is the observed 
one, even though it cannot be predicted. Nevertheless, there is a sufficient reason for 
the “collapse of the wave-function” or any other physical phenomenon. Quite generally, 
every effect, whether in the atomic or the macroscopic world, must have a sufficient 
reason, and the basic principle of science is to investigate and discover it. 
Finally, the main argument of the present article is that it is with a priori concepts 
that we may study and describe the world. Anachronisms apart, we have seen that 
the search for the substance of classical philosophy evolved in modern physics to the 
concept of field, interpreted as the ultimate underlying substance of the world. The field 
is described in terms of space and time, and it is interpreted as the sufficient reason for 
the existence of subatomic particles, that is, matter and its interactions.
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